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Abstract
Dimension Theory allows the representation of
any finite set of alternatives in a real space, pro-
vided that the associated preference relation de-
fines a partial order set. Such a representation can
be very useful whenever criteria are not known,
are therefore we can not even address the prob-
lem of evaluating their respective weights. In this
paper we propose that the importance of under-
lying criteria can be approached taking into ac-
count those possible representations associated to
the dimension of the binary preference relations
between criteria.
Keywords: Multicriteria Decision Analysis, Val-
ued Preference Relations, Dimension Theory.
1 Introduction
Assigning weights to criteria is a key issue in
multicriteria decision making, since they use to
be associated to the importance of those crite-
ria explaining decision making. In fact, most ap-
proaches in the literature assume that decision
maker is always able to evaluate importance of
all existing criteria by means of a real value. But
sometimes it is enough to know the relative po-
sition of each criteria in the real line (see, e.g.,
[8, 11] and [3].
Real-life applications show that, quite often, de-
cision makers can not decide which one between
two criteria is more important, since they are in-
comparable for such a decision maker. In most
of the weighting methods this situation is unac-
ceptable: decision makers should always be able
establish a linear order on the set of criteria.
In this paper we want to stress the need of meth-
ods allowing to model those inconsistencies be-
tween criteria, if they really appear in decision
maker mind. Our approach is based upon a main
argument: a good representation of alternatives
should give some hint about the structure of each
decision making problem, and should therefore
help decision maker to understand the problem
and determine the importance or weights of cri-
teria.
The paper is organized as follow: in section 2
we present a short review of classical dimension
theory, pointing out its limitations. In section 3
we present a new dimension concept allowing the
representation of arbitrary binary preference re-
lations, and we extend this concept to the valued
preference relation context. Then, in section 4
we propose a new method to determine criteria
weights by means of the information in this way
obtained. The paper ends with a final comments
section stressing the relevance of this approach.
2 Classical dimension theory
Dimension concept has been widely developed in
the context of crisp binary relations R ⊂ X ×X,
i.e, mappings
µR : X ×X → {0, 1}
where X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} represents a finite set
of alternatives and µR(xi, xj) = 1 whenever xiRxj
and µR(xi, xj) = 0 otherwise.
Dimension theory was initially developed by
Dushnik-Miller [2], and subsequently applied to
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partial orders, i.e., crisp binary relations such
that the following conditions hold: non reflex-
ivity (µR(xi, xi) = 0 ∀xi ∈ X), antisymmetry
(µR(xi, xj) = 1 ⇒ µR(xj , xi) = 0), and transitiv-
ity (µR(xi, xj) = µR(xj , xk) = 1 ⇒ µR(xi, xk) =
1).
Based on a result due to Szpilrajn [12] proving
that every partial order can be represented as an
intersection of linear orders, the dimension of a
partial order R is defined by Dushnik-Miller [2] as
the minimum number of linear orders (complete
partial orders) whose intersection is R. Being R
a partial order set (poset) with dimension d, each
element xi ∈ X can be represented in the real
space (x1i , . . . , x
d
i ) ∈ <d in such a way that xiRxj
if and only if
xki > x
k
j ∀k ∈ {1, . . . d} ∀xi, xj ∈ X
Of course, dimension is unique, but the associated
representation is not unique (see Trotter [13]).
2.1 Dimension function
Given X a finite set of alternatives, a valued pref-
erence relation in X is a fuzzy subset of the carte-
sian product X × X, being characterized by its
membership function
µ : X ×X → [0, 1]
in such a way that µ(xi, xj) represents the degree
to which alternative xi is preferred to alternative
xj . We shall assume that such a preference inten-
sity is referred to a strict preference, so by defini-
tion µ(xi, xi) = 0 ∀xi ∈ X.
Once a value α ∈ (0, 1] has been fixed, the α-cut
of a valued preference relation µ is defined as the
crisp binary relation Rα in X such that
xiR
αxj ⇐⇒ µ(xi, xj) ≥ α
Then, meanwhile Rα is a partial order set (anti-
symmetric and transitive), it defines a crisp par-
tial order, so its dimension d(α) is defined. A
dimension function has been in this way defined
d : [0, 1]→ N
where d(α) = dim(Rα) whenever such a dimen-
sion is well defined. In this way, dimension func-
tion translates classical dimension into a valued
preference context.
Crisp dimension of all α-cuts, as proposed in [5],
seems a useful hint for decision makers in order
to understand the decision making problem. In
fact, they are taken into account in [1] in order to
obtain operative bounds.
However, a first approach requires antisymmetry
and transitivity for each α-cut. In case our valued
preference relation is max-min transitive, i.e.,
µ(xi, xj) ≥ min{µ(xi, xk), µ(xk, xj)}
for all xi, xj , xk ∈ X, then Rα is a partial order
set whenever antisymmetry holds, i.e., meanwhile
those α-cuts do not show 2-order cycles. In partic-
ular (see [6]), Rα is antisymmetric for all α > α2,
being
α2 = max
xi 6=xj
min{µ(xi, xj), µ(xj , xi)}
Therefore, since µ is max-min transitive if and
only if every α-cut Rα is transitive (see [7] but
also [1]), if µ is max-min transitive, then we can
consider the dimension of Rα for every α > α2.
So, some kind of general representation for any
arbitrary α-cut is desirable, even if it is non sym-
metric or non transitive. Any useful representa-
tion should allow a dimension function being de-
fined in the whole unit interval, but in some way
showing every inconsistency. Hence, we should be
searching for explanatory representations of arbi-
trary crisp preference relations. As pointed out in
[5, 6], there is an absolute need to understand and
explain decision maker inconsistencies: accepted
inconsistencies are some times extremely informa-
tive. These considerations suggests a generaliza-
tion of Dushnik-Miller representation theorem, as
shown in the next section.
3 Dimension theory for arbitrary
preference relations
As already pointed out, representation of arbi-
trary binary preference relation is itself an objec-
tive, perhaps more interesting than the associated
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dimension value. The following result shows that
any strict preference relation can be represented
in terms of unions and intersections of linear or-
ders (see [5, 6] but also [4]): meanwhile incompa-
rability is explained by the intersection operator,
inconsistencies (i.e., symmetry and non transitiv-
ity) will be associated to the union operator, at
least at a first stage.
Theorem 3.1 Let X = {x1, ..., xn} be a finite set
of alternatives, and let us consider
C = {L/L linear order on X }
Then for every non-reflexive crisp binary rela-
tion R on X there exist a family of linear orders
{Lst}s,t ⊂ C such that
R =
⋃
s
⋂
t
Lst
Proof: see [5].
The classical concept of dimension is in this way
generalized into a more general framework, now
not being restricted to partial order sets.
Definition 3.1 Let us consider X a finite set of
alternatives. The generalized dimension of a crisp
binary relation R is the minimum number of dif-
ferent linear orders, Lst, such that
R =
⋃
s
⋂
t
Lst
It should be pointed out that, in general, general-
ized dimension of a partial order may not be equal
to its classical dimension value.
3.1 Dimension Function of arbitrary
valued preference relations
Based upon the above generalized representation
of crisp preferences we can therefore assure the
existence of a generalized dimension function:
Definition 3.2 Given a valued strict preference
relation
µ : X ×X → [0, 1]
its generalized dimension function is given by the
mapping
D : (0, 1] → N
α → D(α) = Dim(Rα)
where Dim(Rα) is the generalized dimension of
Rα.
This approach will then lead to a generalized di-
mension function showing the generalized dimen-
sion for every α-cut, no matter if our valued pref-
erence relation µ is max-min transitive or not. In
general, being X a finite set of alternatives, the
interval (0, 1] is divided in two subsets, depend-
ing on the existence of union operators in the
above generalized representation, suggesting the
existence or non existence of inconsistencies for
each Rα, α ∈ (0, 1].
4 Determination of weights
If the search for good representation models is
an objective, dimension theory seems a natural
alternative. In this section we will show how we
can use this representation in order to determine
the importance of each criteria, avoiding the strict
constraints assumed in standard approaches (see
[10, 11, 8, 3]), both in the crisp and valued context
(see [4]).
Given µC : C × C :−→: [0, 1] a valued preference
relation between the criteria, the generalized di-
mension function, and the associated representa-
tions, for each value α ∈ [0, 1] will be useful to
determine the importance of each criteria in a de-
cision making problem.
4.1 Partial order criteria sets
Let µC : C × C :−→ {0, 1} be the binary pref-
erence relation between criteria. Let us sup-
pose first that µC is a partial order set. Let
R =
⋂
k=1,d Lk be a representation of R, be-
ing accepted (understood) by the decision maker.
Notice that most classical approaches assume
dim(R) = 1, so criteria can be represented in the
real line.
Definition 4.1 Let C be the set of criteria and
let L be a lineal order on C, then we will say that
FL : C −→ [0, 1] is a fair allocation rule for the
pair (C,L) if and only if:
• If ciLcj then FL(ci) < FL(cj).
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•
∑
c∈C
FL(c) = 1.
An example of fair allocation rule could be
F (cj) =Wj where
Wj =
1
rj
n∑
i=1
1
ri
or
Wj =
(n− rj + 1)
n∑
i=1
(n− ri + 1)
being rj the position of the j-th criteria in the
above ordering.
It is easy to see that Saaty, Simos and Figueira-
Roy models [10, 11, 3] are fair allocation rules in
the sense of the above definition, although some
of these methods require additional information.
Once we have a fair allocation rule FL for each lin-
eal order L, we only need to aggregate the weights
(FL(c1), FL(c2), . . . FL(c|C|)) in such a way the
sum of final weights is one.
So, given a representation of the Binary prefer-
ence relation R =
d⋂
k=1
Lk, a family of fair alloca-
tion rules for this representation {FLk} and given
φ : [0, 1]d −→ [0, 1] an aggregation operator, the
final weights of the criteria (W1,W2, . . .W|C|) can
be obtained as
Wi = φ (FL1(ci), . . . , FLd(ci)) ∀i = 1, . . . , |C|
Notice that aggregation operators can not be cho-
sen arbitrarily, since the final sum of weights must
be one.
Definition 4.2 Let φ : [0, 1]d −→ [0, 1] be an ag-
gregation operator, we will say that this operator
is doubly efficient respect to the sum if
|C|∑
i=1
φ(w1i , w
2
i , . . . , w
d
i ) = 1
when
|C|∑
j=1
wji = 1 ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , d
Proposition 4.1 If φ is a additive aggregation
operator i.e.
φn(a1, . . . , ad) =
d∑
k=1
ckak (1)
then φ is doubly efficient respect to the sum.
Proof: As φ(1, . . . , 1) = 1 then we have that∑
i=1,n ai = 1. Then
|C|∑
i=1
φ(w1i , w
2
i , . . . , w
d
i ) =
|C|∑
i=1
d∑
r=1
arw
r
i =
d∑
r=1
ar
|C|∑
i=1
wri =
d∑
r=1
ar = 1.
So we can use any additive aggregation operator.
Example 4.1 Let C1, . . . C3 be the criteria of a
Decision Making problem, and let R = µC = 0 0 00 0 0
1 1 0
, i.e. c1 < c3 (the importance of
c1 is less than c3), c2 < c3 and c1||c2 (we know
that the importance of these criteria are incompa-
rable). Observe that this possibility is not allowed
in standard methods. In this case, dim(R) = 2
because R = [c1, c2, c3]
⋂
[c2, c1, c3]. If decision
maker accepts and understands this representa-
tion, and for example if FLk(cj) = wj, where wj =
1
rj
n∑
i=1
1
ri
, then the weights for L1 are (0.2, 0.3, 0.5),
and for L2 are (0.3, 0.2, 0.5). If φ is the median
aggregate operator W = (0.25, 0.25, 0.5)
4.2 Valued preference relation
Let µC : C × C :−→ [0, 1] be a valued preference
relation between the criteria of the decision prob-
lem. In this sense µC(ci, cj) represents the degree
to which the decision maker believes that ci is
more important than cj . In order to generalize the
classical representation into valued representation
we need to impose that valued preference relation
is max-min transitive and also µC(c, c) = 0. For
each α ∈ (0, 1] a representation of criteria can be
obtained and we can determine the importance
(measuring as weights) of each criteria. So we
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have a weighting function W (α) depending of the
aptitude of the decision maker it is important to
notice that this function shows different decision
maker attitudes. In fact, different people with
the same valued preference relation, if forced to
be crisp, can face different problems depending on
their exigency level.
If we consider that any aptitude of the deci-
sion maker is possible, we can aggregate this
information, for example as
∫ 1
0
W (α)dα. Of
course, if we know that the probability distribu-
tion of the aptitude (define by means of their den-
sity function a(α)), we can aggregate W (α) as∫ 1
0
W (α) a(α)dα.
We want to emphasize the importance of the
weights function as an additional representation
tool to dimension function, in order to understand
better the problem.
4.3 Generalized dimension function
The above sections allow us to obtain the impor-
tance of each criteria when decision maker pref-
erences between criteria are max-min transitive,
but of course this is not always possible. In order
to determine the weights in a more general case,
Pachon et al. (2003) introduce a new dimension
concept that allow us to represent any binary re-
lation, as already shown in a section 3.
Given R a binary preference relation represented
as R =
k⋃
r=1
dr⋂
s=1
Lrs we can aggregate this infor-
mation taking into account a fair allocation rule
for each Lrs. Now we need to aggregate the in-
formation in two steps in order to obtain the fi-
nal importance of each criteria. Let us denote
wrsj = FLr,s(cj) the weigh of the j-th criteria in
the lineal order Lrs. First, we need to aggre-
gate the information contained in ∩s=1,drLrs, ob-
taining wrj = φr(w
r,1
j , w
r,2
j , . . . , w
r,dr
j ). The final
weightWj is the aggregation of wrj ∀r = 1, . . . , k,
so Wj = ϕ(w1j , w
2
j , . . . , w
k
j ).
Given R = ∪r=1,k ∩s=1,dr Lrs a representation of
the binary preference relation, φr : [0, 1]dr −→
[0, 1] be a family of aggregation operator for r =
1, . . . k. and ϕ : [0, 1]k −→ [0, 1] other aggregation
operator, we need to impose
|C|∑
j=1
ϕ
(
φ1
(
w11j , . . . w
1,d1
j
)
, . . . , φk
(
wk1j , . . . w
k,dk
j
))
takes value 1, for all wrsj such that
|C|∑
j=1
wrsj = 1 ∀s = 1, . . . , dr ; ∀r = 1, . . . , k
Proposition 4.2 Given R = ∪r=1,k ∩s=1,dr Lrs
a representation of the binary preference relation,
φr : [0, 1]dr −→ [0, 1] a family of aggregation op-
erators for r = 1, . . . k, and ϕ : [0, 1]k −→ [0, 1]
other aggregation operator, if ϕ and {φr}r = 1, k
are aggregation operators being double efficient
with respect to the sum, then
|c|∑
j=1
ϕ
(
φ1
(
w11j , . . . w
1,d1
j
)
, . . . , φk
(
wk1j , . . . w
k,dk
j
))
is one, for all wrsj such that
|C|∑
j=1
wrsj = 1 ∀s = 1, . . . , dr ; ∀r = 1, . . . , k
Proof: Let us denote by wrj = φr(w
r1
j , . . . , w
rdr
j ).
As ϕ is a aggregation operator double effi-
cient respect to the sum we only need to prove
that
|C|∑
j=1
wrj = 1 ∀r = 1, . . . k. Fixed r ∈
{1, . . . k}
|C|∑
j=1
wrj =
|C|∑
j=1
φr(wr1j , . . . , w
rdr
j ) where∑
s=1,dr w
rs
j = 1,∀j, then as φr is doubly efficient
|C|∑
j=1
φr(wr1j , . . . , w
rdr
j ) = 1 so the result holds.
Proposition 4.3 If ϕ and φ are additive aggre-
gation rules then
|C|∑
i=1
Wi = 1
Proof: direct from 4.1 and 4.2.
5 Final remarks
In this paper we propose an alternative method to
determine the importance of criteria in a decision
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problem, based on a representation of criteria in
a real space. This method will be specially useful
when incomparability between criteria appears.
From the above comments it is clear that addi-
tive operator is not unique. Operators should
therefore be chosen carefully, taking into account
the idea of aggregation our decision maker has in
mind.
It can be also observed from the definition of di-
mension that the associated representation is not
unique. We should be looking forward a use-
ful representation, understandable by the decision
maker.
The above dimension approach to preference rela-
tions (valued or not valued) opens in our opinion
an interesting approach in order to help decision
maker to put in clear the importance of criteria,
although alternative rationalities should be also
tried (see [7]).
Anyway, this paper stresses the role of represen-
tation tools in order to get a good understanding
of every decision making problem, as a previous
requirement for decision making. In particular,
we explore representation techniques based upon
dimension theory, showing how this approach can
give some interesting hint about the underlying
criteria and their relative importance in a quite
general context, but still being consistent with
some key standard procedures.
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